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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
After a decade-long reorganization, the Reading Railroad 
emerged from bankruptcy on January 1, 1981. On that 
day, the newly-established Reading Company1 was given a 
fresh start by a consummation order which granted 
Reading protection from all pre-consummation debts and 
liabilities. Now, sixteen years later, the Consolidated Rail 
Corporation (Conrail) asks that we circumvent the 
protection of the bankruptcy discharge and permit Conrail 
to seek contribution from Reading for environmental clean- 
up costs. The district court rejected Conrail's claim. We will 
affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 
This appeal involves a number of issues under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, as 
amended by the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub.L. No. 990499, 
§ 101 et seq., 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). We will first have to 
determine what type of claim or claims appellants, Conrail 
and the United States, can maintain against Reading. We 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In this opinion, we will refer to the bankrupt railroad as the Reading 
Railroad and the post-bankruptcy, non-rail entity as the Reading 
Company, or simply Reading. 
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will then consider how Reading's bankruptcy affects 
appellants' ability to enforce any claims. 
 
As a result of our consideration of these issues, wefind 
that Conrail's only viable claim against Reading is one for 
contribution under § 113(f). We also find that this claim 
was not discharged by Reading's consummation order. 
Nevertheless, we determine that Conrail's claim fails as a 
matter of law because Reading is not liable to the United 
States under § 107(a) and consequently Reading cannot be 
liable to Conrail for contribution of the response costs that 




The roots of this dispute stretch back to November 23, 
1971, when the Reading Railroad filed for reorganization 
under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, formerly 11 
U.S.C. § 205 (1976) (repealed 1978). By 1973, seven other 
major American railroads had joined Reading in 
reorganization. The seemingly intractable nature of these 
bankruptcies, combined with the obvious public need for 
continuing rail service, spurred Congress to action. The 
result was the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 
("RRRA"), 45 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., which established a plan 
for conveying the rail assets of the bankrupt corporations to 
a new entity, Conrail. The railroads would receive Conrail 
securities in return for their assets, and the former 
railroads would then emerge from bankruptcy as new, non- 
rail entities. See In re Reading Co., 24 B.R. 858, 859-60 
(E.D. Pa. 1980). 
 
On May 2, 1974, the district court subjected the Reading 
Railroad to the RRRA. See In re Reading Co., 378 F.Supp. 
474, 481 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd sub nom. In re Penn Central 
Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895 (Sp. Ct.R.R.A. 1974). On 
April 1, 1976, Reading Railroad's rail assets were conveyed 
to Conrail pursuant to the final system plan, In re Reading 
Co., 24 B.R. at 860, and the company's 5,664 rail 
employees became eligible for employment with Conrail, 
Final System Plan of the U.S. Railway Assoc. at 162, 
reprinted in Supplemental Appendix at 178. "The remainder 
of the estate then consisted of real property, a trucking 
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company, some marine equipment, other investments, and 
the probable proceeds from the [rail assets] valuation case 
. . .." 24 B.R. at 860. For all practical purposes, Reading 
ceased to be a railroad on April 1, 1976. 
 
The Reading Railroad reorganization continued for 
another four years. By mid-1979, the Trustees hadfiled an 
Amended Plan for Reorganization with the district court. On 
May 21, 1980, after notice to numerous parties including 
the United States and Conrail, the district court approved 
the Amended Plan. 24 B.R. at 874. Both the United States 
and Conrail attended hearings on the plan's confirmation 
and proposed consummation. Neither objected. On 
December 23, 1980, the district court entered an order that 
established December 31, 1980, as the consummation date 
for the plan. 
 
The most significant feature of the consummation plan 
for purposes of this appeal was a sweeping injunction 
which protected the Reading Company from all liability 
based on the obligations of its predecessor: 
 
7.02 Injunction. All persons, firms, governmental 
entities and corporations, wherever situated, located or 
domiciled, are hereby permanently restrained and 
enjoined from instituting, prosecuting or pursuing, or 
attempting to institute, prosecute or pursue, any suits 
or proceedings, at law or in equity or otherwise against 
the Reorganized Company or its successors or assigns 
or against any of the assets or property of the 
Reorganized Company or its successors or assigns, 
directly or indirectly, on account of or based upon any 
right, claim or interest of any kind or nature 
whatsoever which any such person, firm, governmental 
entity or corporation may have in, to or against the 
Debtor, the Reading Trustees, or any of their assets or 
properties . . . by reason or on account of any 
obligation or obligations incurred by the Debtor or any 
of its Trustees in these proceedings, except the 
obligations imposed on the Reorganized Company by 
the Plan or by this Order or reserved for resolution or 
adjudication by this Order. 
 
In re Reading Co., Memorandum and Order 2004, Bankr. 
No. 71-823 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1980) (Consummation Order 
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and Final Decree). With this injunction in place, the 
Reading Company emerged from bankruptcy on January 1, 
1981. 
 
At the same time that the Reading Railroad's Trustees 
were drawing up Reading's final plan of reorganization, 
major developments were taking place in Congress. On 
December 11, 1980, three weeks before the Reading 
Railroad's plan consummation date, CERCLA became law, 
effective immediately. The statute imposed retroactive 
liability on any person who, prior to the statute's passage, 
had disposed of, transported, or arranged for the disposal 
of hazardous substances. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 944 
F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 1991). It granted the Environmental 
Protection Agency ("EPA") broad powers to enforce this 
mandate. United States v. Alcan Aluminum. Corp., 964 F.2d 
252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
CERCLA's embrace would encompass Conrail and the 
nation's railroads. See 126 Cong. Rec. 26,061-62 (1980) 
(letter to Senator Howard W. Cannon from Richard Briggs, 
Association of American Railroads) (describing CERCLA as 
a threat to the railroad industry); Superfund: H.R. 4571, 
5290 Before the Subcomm. On Transp. & Commerce of the 
House Interstate & Foreign Commerce Comm., 96th Cong. 
1st Sess. 132 (1980) (statement of Barbara Blum, Deputy 
Administrator, EPA) (identifying railroads as one type of 
violator whom CERCLA would address). The EPA 
demonstrated its awareness of the new law and its 
immediate applicability to the Reading bankruptcy by 
notifying Reading prior to discharge that the EPA would 
treat a hazardous waste site in McAdoo, Pennsylvania, as a 
CERCLA site. Fifth Report to the Court on the Progress of 
Cleanup at McAdoo, Pa., In re Reading Co., Bankr. No. 71- 
828 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1980). However, neither the EPA nor 
the United States filed any claims in the Reading 
bankruptcy; nor did they make any mention in those 
proceedings of other hazardous waste sites or of the 
potential for additional hazardous waste liability. 
 
This appeal arises from the clash of CERCLA liability with 
the discharge granted to Reading as a result of its 
bankruptcy, a clash which occurred at a fifty acre site on 
the south bank of the Schuylkill River, opposite 
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Douglassville, Pennsylvania. Since 1941, a business, 
eventually known as Berks Associates, Inc., had operated a 
solvent recovery and oil recycling business on the property. 
On October 31, 1980, 41 days prior to CERCLA's passage, 
the EPA identified Douglassville as a potentially hazardous 
site.2 
 
The EPA was already familiar with Douglassville because 
of problems that had occurred there in the early 1970s. In 
November 1970, heavy rains caused storage lagoons at 
Douglassville to fail. Two to three million gallons of waste 
sludge escaped into the Schuylkill River. The Department of 
the Interior, acting pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1251 et. seq., responded to the spill. Two years 
later, Hurricane Agnes caused a major flood of the 
Schuylkill, washing more sludge into the river. The EPA 
responded, invoking the oil spill provisions of the Clean 
Water Act. As part of the clean-up, the EPA transported 
sludge from the Douglassville site, using boxcars supplied 
by the Reading Railroad, which had a rail line serving the 
facility. 
 
On June 12, 1986, acting pursuant to CERCLA § 104(e), 
42 U.S.C. § 9604(e), the EPA requested information from 
Reading about Douglassville. On June 29, 1988, the EPA 
designated Reading a potentially responsible party ("PRP"), 
alleging that between July 6, 1965, and March 12, 1976, 
Reading had either generated or transported shipments of 
waste oil to Douglassville. Then, on July 31, 1991, acting 
pursuant to CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606, the United 
States ordered thirty-six PRPs to undertake remedial 
actions at the Douglassville site. The list of PRPs included 
Conrail, but not Reading. On the same day, the United 
States brought an action under CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a), against the same group of PRPs for response 
costs incurred in cleaning up the Douglassville site and for 
a declaration of future costs. United States v. Berks Assoc., 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Further EPA activity took place at the Douglassville site in April, 1982, 
when the EPA began actively investigating the location. On September 8, 
1983, the EPA added Douglassville to CERCLA's National Priorities List, 
a list of the nation's worst environmental sites. Solvent recovery and oil 
recycling operations at the Douglassville site ceased in 1985. 
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Inc., Civ. Action No. 91-4868, 1992 WL 68346 (E.D.Pa. 
Apr.1, 1992). 
 
Conrail and the other primary defendants then brought a 
third-party action against the Reading Company and six 
hundred other PRPs, seeking contribution for any liability 
from the Douglassville site. Reading in turn sought an 
injunction from the district court, on the basis that any 
liability, which it may have had, had been discharged in 
bankruptcy. 
 
The district court granted Reading's request for injunctive 
relief. In re Reading Co., 900 F.Supp. 738, 741 (E.D. Pa. 
1995). The court held that the word "contribution" as used 
in § 113(f) should be given its plain meaning so that 
Conrail's action, by one PRP seeking recovery from another 
PRP, could only proceed as a claim for contribution under 
CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). Id. at 748. Moreover, 
because the usual meaning of "contribution" requires 
common liability over to a third party, Reading's liability to 
Conrail was dependent on whether Reading was potentially 
liable to the United States. Id. The district court held that 
any such liability had been discharged by the bankruptcy 
consummation order because all the necessary elements of 
a CERCLA claim existed when the plan was consummated 
and the United States had constructive knowledge that the 
claim existed at that time. Id. at 745. As a result, the 
district court concluded that Reading was not liable to 
Conrail for contribution. Both Conrail and the United 
States appealed. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OR REVIEW 
 
The district court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and §1334 (repealed 1978) and 42 U.S.C. § 9613. 
We take jurisdiction from the district court's final order 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This appeal presents issues 
of statutory interpretation, subject to plenary review. Manor 
Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 124 (3d Cir. 1991). The 
lone exception is the district court's factual finding of 
knowledge, see discussion infra, Part III.B., which we 
review for clear error. See Sheet Metal Workers, Local 19 v. 
2300 Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1991); Riehl 
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 19, 24 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. The Nature of Conrail's Claim 
 
The core question posed by this appeal is whether 
Conrail can make a claim against Reading for the costs of 
the Douglassville clean-up. To answer this question, we 
must determine the nature of the cause of action that 
Conrail possesses and whether that cause of action is 
dependent on Reading's liability to the United States for 
costs of the Douglassville clean-up. Conrail's third party 
complaint against Reading alleged four different causes of 
action: (1) cost recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 107(a)(4)(B), (2) 
contribution under 42 U.S.C. § 113(f), (3) common law 
contribution, and (4) common law restitution. We will first 
address the validity of the common law claims. 
 
Like the district court, we find that CERCLA preempts 
Conrail's common law theories. See In re Reading Co., 900 
F.Supp. at 744 n.6. As the Supreme Court has explained in 
preemption analysis "our sole task is to ascertain the intent 
of Congress." California Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. 
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987). Congress may manifest 
its intent when it expressly preempts state regulation, when 
it implicitly preempts state regulation by so occupying the 
field with comprehensive federal regulation that it leaves no 
room for state law, or, again implicitly, when there is an 
actual conflict between state and federal law. Conflict may 
arise either because "compliance with both federal and 
state regulations is a physical impossibility," or because the 
state law stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 
Id. at 280-81. We have held that, in enacting CERCLA, 
Congress did not explicitly preempt all state law, nor did it 
create a comprehensive scheme of regulation leaving no 
room for supplementation. Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 
F.2d 122, 125-26 (3d Cir. 1991). We must therefore 
consider the third basis for preemption, actual conflict. 
 
Unlike other areas where we have declined to find an 
actual conflict between CERCLA and state regulation, see 
Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 38 F.3d 682, 688-90 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(finding no conflict between CERCLA statute of limitations 
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for contribution and Delaware state law limiting time period 
for claims against decedent's estate); Manor Care, 950 F.2d 
at 127 (finding no conflict between CERCLA and cost 
recovery provisions of New Jersey Spill Compensation and 
Control Act), we do find a conflict here between Conrail's 
common law claims for contribution and restitution and the 
remedies expressly provided in the statute. The conflict 
arises because the state law remedies obstruct the intent of 
Congress. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281. As we explain more 
fully below, when Congress expressly created a statutory 
right of contribution in CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(f), it made that remedy a part of an elaborate 
settlement scheme aimed at the efficient resolution of 
environmental disputes. Permitting independent common 
law remedies would create a path around the statutory 
settlement scheme, raising an obstacle to the intent of 
Congress. We conclude therefore that Conrail's common law 
claims are preempted by CERCLA § 113(f). 
 
We next turn to Conrail's statutory claims. Conrail 
contends that it possesses two separate and distinct causes 
of action, one under § 107(a)(4)(B) and the other under 
§ 113(f). Reading argues on the other hand that Congress's 
creation of an express provision in § 113(f), governing 
contribution, superseded the judicially created private right 
of action that existed under § 107(a)(4)(B). For this reason, 
Reading contends that Conrail cannot assert a 
§ 107(a)(4)(B) claim when the provisions of§ 113(f) have 
come into effect. We agree that, in an action which presents 
a claim for apportionment of clean-up costs, § 113(f) 
trumps § 107(a)(4)(B). 
 
This interaction between § 113(f) and § 107(a)(4)(B) 
presents a question of statutory interpretation. We begin 
our review therefore with an examination of the language of 
the statute. Section 107 establishes CERCLA's basic 
framework under which persons are liable for past 
environmental harms. It sets out four prerequisites for cost 
recovery: 
 
(1) the defendant falls within one of the four categories 
of "responsible parties";3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), these categories are: 
 
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
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(2) the hazardous substances are disposed at a "facility";4 
 
(3) there is a "release"5 or threatened release of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous 
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous 
substances were disposed of, 
 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged 
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for 
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned 
or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any 
facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or 
entity and containing such hazardous substances; and 
 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances 
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels 
or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or 
a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, 
of a hazardous substance . . .. 
 
4. Under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8), a facility is defined as: 
 
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline 
(including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), 
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage 
container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or 
area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, 
disposed of; or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not 
include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel. 
 
5. Under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22), a "release" is defined as: 
 
any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, 
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing 
into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of 
barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any 
hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant), but excludes (A) 
any release which results in exposure to persons solely within a 
workplace, with respect to a claim which such persons may assert 
against the employer of such persons, (B) emissions form the engine 
exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline 
pumping station engine, (C) release of source, byproduct, or special 
nuclear material from a nuclear incident, as those terms are defined 
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, if such release is subject to 
requirements with respect to financial protection established by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission under section 170 of such Act, or, 
for the purposes of section 9604 of this title or any other response 
action, any release of source byproduct, or special nuclear material 
from any processing site designated under section 7912(a)(1) or 
7942(a) of this title, and (D) the normal application of fertilizer. 
 
                                11 
hazardous substances from the facility into the 
environment; 
 
(4) the release causes the incurrence of "response costs."6 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9607; United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 
964 F.2d 252, 258-59 (3d Cir. 1992). Where these 
requirements are met, § 107 also establishes four general 
categories of damages for which parties are liable. Among 
these, § 107(a)(4)(B) provides that a PRP's liability shall 
include "any other costs of response incurred by any other 
person consistent with the national contingency plan." 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).7 
 
The "any other costs of response" language in 
§ 107(a)(4)(B) forms the basis for Conrail's claim for 
recovery under that section. We note that pre-SARA, 
Conrail could make a viable claim for contribution under 
§ 107(a)(4)(B). As originally enacted, CERCLA lacked any 
express mechanism by which one party could recover from 
another for paying more than its pro rata share of the costs 
of a clean-up. See United Technologies v. Browning-Ferris 
Industries, Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1994). Courts filled 
this gap by interpreting § 107(a)(4)(B) as providing a private 
right of action by which a party, who had expended 
resources on cleanup efforts, could obtain contribution 
from others. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 
809, 816 n.7 (1994) (noting interpretation); United States v. 
New Castle County, 642 F.Supp. 1258, 1269 (D. Del. 1986) 
(recognizing cause of action). Until the passage of SARA in 
1986, the judicially-created expansion of § 107(a)(4)(B) 
served as the sole means by which parties could obtain 
contribution. 
 
SARA, however, in § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), expressly 
provided for contribution. The section states: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25), the terms "respond" or "response" are 
defined to mean "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action; all such 
terms (including the terms `removal' and `remedial action') include 
enforcement activities related thereto." 
 
7. As written, the four categories of damages appear to relate only to 
§ 107(a)(4). Courts have consistently ignored this drafting error, and it is 
well established that the liability categories apply to all four categories of 
PRPs under § 107(a). 
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Any person may seek contribution from any other 
person who is liable or potentially liable under section 
9607(a) [§ 107(a)] of this title, during or following any 
civil action under section 9606 of this title or under 
section 9607(a) of this title. . . . Nothing in this 
subsection shall diminish the right of any person to 
bring an action for contribution in the absence of a 
civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 
9607 of this title. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). 
 
The meaning of the plain language of this section is 
supported by SARA's legislative history, which states that a 
principal goal of § 113(f) was to "clarif[y] and confirm[ ] the 
right of a person held jointly and severally liable under 
CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially liable 
parties, when the person believes that it has assumed a 
share of the cleanup or cost that may be greater than its 
equitable share under the circumstances." S.Rep.No.11, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1985), reprinted in 2 Legislative 
History of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act of 1986 at 636 (1990). In passing § 113(f), Congress 
acted to codify existing federal common law and to replace 
the judicially crafted measure with an express statutory 
remedy. 
 
Thus, the language of § 113(f), permitting contribution, 
replaced the judicially created right to contribution under 
§ 107(a)(4)(B). We find support for this conclusion in the 
comprehensive scheme that SARA created. SARA's 
modifications encourage the efficient resolution of 
environmental disputes by creating a settlement system in 
which potential damages increase dramatically for parties 
who refuse to settle. See generally United States v. Charter 
Int'l Oil Co., 83 F.3d 510 (1st Cir. 1996) (describing 
scheme). The first part of the system grants protection from 
contribution actions to settling parties for actions arising 
from "matters addressed" in a consent decree. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(f)(2). The second part limits the settlement's effect to 
a reduction in the aggregate liability of the remaining PRPs. 
Because settlement reduces the total amount recoverable 
from the remaining, non-settling parties only by the 
amount of settlement, non-settling PRPs remain liable for 
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the balance of the aggregate environmental liability. Id. 
Consequently, PRPs, who choose to settle, gain protection 
from contribution, enjoy potentially favorable settlement 
terms, and retain the ability to seek contribution from other 
defendants. PRPs, who choose not to settle, are barred from 
seeking contribution from the settling PRPs and thus face 
potentially disproportionate liability. This system gives the 
United States obvious and important leverage to encourage 
quick and effective resolution of environmental disputes. 
 
If a party seeks contribution under § 113(f)(1) from a 
settling party, the protections of § 113(f)(2) and (f)(3) are 
immediately applicable. SARA's system operates as 
intended. But if a party should instead seek contribution 
under § 107(a)(4)(B), that would throw the proverbial 
monkey wrench into the works. If a party could end run 
§ 113(f)(2) and (3) by suing a settling party under 
§ 107(a)(4)(B) for "costs of response," the settlement scheme 
would be bypassed. The incentive to early settlement would 
disappear, and the extent of litigation involved in a CERCLA 
case would increase dramatically. Consent agreements 
would no longer provide protection, and settling parties 
would have to endure additional rounds of litigation to 
apportion their losses. This undesirable alternative suggests 
all the more clearly that Congress intended to replace 
§ 107(a)(4)(B)'s implied contribution remedy when it enacted 
§ 113(f). 
 
Against this authority, Conrail proposes two sources in 
support of its separate § 107 contribution action. It first 
points to language in § 113(f), which refers to "a civil action" 
under § 107(a). The fact, however, that § 113(f)(1) mentions 
the availability of a civil action under § 107(a) does not a 
fortiori indicate that Congress intended to permit an action 
for contribution to be brought either under § 107(a) or 
under § 113(f)(1), at the discretion of the litigant. After all, 
a "civil action" can be initiated for direct costs, as well as 
for contribution. 
 
Conrail's second argument is based on a comment in Key 
Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994), where in 
dictum the U.S. Supreme Court observed: "the statute 
[CERCLA] now expressly authorizes a cause of action for 
contribution in § 113 and impliedly authorizes a similar 
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and somewhat overlapping remedy in § 107." Id. at 815- 
816. To the extent that the Supreme Court refers to an 
"overlap," we construe this overlap to consist of the fact 
that some courts have held that a landowner may bring a 
direct action under § 107(a)(4)(B) to recover its own clean- 
up costs from a polluter. Accord, Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. 
Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1242 (7th Cir. 1997); 
AM Int'l, Inc. v. Datacard Corp. Inc., 106 F.3d 1342, 1347 
(7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a landowner, who paid less 
because it knew it was buying into an expensive cleanup, 
was "a little less `innocent' than the landowner described in 
Akzo" but still might recover under § 107(a)(4)(B) for 
cleanup of contamination on its property due to a third 
party spill); Akzo Coating, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 
765 (7th Cir. 1994) (hypothesizing that "a landowner forced 
to clean up hazardous materials that a third party spilled 
onto its property or that migrated there from adjacent 
lands" might, as a private party, have a direct cost recovery 
action under § 107(a)); United Technologies, 33 F.3d at 100. 
Like our sister courts, we believe that § 107(a)(4)(B) retains 
this role. See New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 
___ F.3d ___ [typescript at 16] (3d Cir. 1997). The fact, 
however, that a direct action might be brought under 
§ 107(a) does not open the door for a PRP to bring an action 
for contribution under that same section. Indeed, the fact 
that § 113(f)(1) specifically permits an action for 
contribution to be brought "in the absence of a civil action 
under . . . section [107]" reenforces our conclusion that 
Congress intended § 113 to be the sole means for seeking 
contribution--at whatever time in the cleanup process the 
party, seeking contribution, decides to pursue it. 
 
We rely therefore on CERCLA's plain meaning to hold 
that § 113(f) replaces the judicially created cause of action 
under § 107(a)(4)(B) to the extent that a party seeks 
contribution. See Halliburton NUS Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 1997 
WL 217627 (3d Cir. 1997); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. 
Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co., 50 F.3d 
1530, 1534-36 (10th Cir. 1995); United Technologies Corp., 
33 F.3d at 101-03; Akzo, 30 F.3d at 764-65; Amoco Oil Co. 
v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989). Having 
reached this determination, we will proceed to the next step 
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in our analysis: whether Conrail's § 107(a)(4)(B) claim falls 
within § 113(f)'s ambit. 
 
As its plain language indicates, § 113(f) is concerned with 
contribution. Although "contribution" is nowhere defined 
within CERCLA, it is a term with a familiar and readily 
acceptable meaning. Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"contribution" as the recovery of "portional shares of 
judgment from other joint tort-feasors whose negligence 
contributed to the injury and who were also liable to the 
plaintiff. . . . The sharing of a loss or payment among 
several[;] [t]he act of any one or several of a number of co- 
debtors, co-sureties, etc., in reimbursing one of their 
number who has paid the whole debt or suffered the whole 
liability, each to the extent of his proportionate share." 
Black's Law Dictionary 297 (5th ed. 1979). As the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has described it, 
contribution denotes a claim "by and between jointly and 
severally liable parties for an appropriate division of the 
payment one of them has been compelled to make." Akzo, 
30 F.3d at 764; see also Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 
1535-36; United Technologies, 33 F.3d at 101. We have 
found nothing that counsels against this reading. 
Accordingly we will adopt it. 
 
In view, therefore, of the language of § 113(f), we have 
little difficulty holding that Conrail is in fact seeking 
contribution from Reading and that Conrail must seek that 
remedy under § 113(f). See Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 
1536 ("In our case, [the] claim . . . must be classified as one 
for contribution"); United Technologies, ("[a]pplying this 
definition, the instant action clearly qualifies as an action 
for contribution under section 9613(f)(1)"); Akzo, 30 F.3d at 
764 (explaining that if a party "liable in some measure for 
the contamination . . . [alleges] that the costs that it has 
incurred should be apportioned equitably amongst itself 
and the others responsible . . ., [t]hat is a quintessential 
claim for contribution"). In its third-party complaint against 
Reading, Conrail, in its § 107(a) claim, seeks 
reimbursement for "all" response costs and, in its § 113(f) 
claim, seeks reimbursement of its "share of contribution" 
for response costs. Clearly, Conrail is seeking contribution 
from Reading for all potential liability Conrail may owe to 
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the United States. To the extent that, in either statutory 
claim, this is Conrail's aim, Conrail's claim is one for 
contribution. We hold that such a claim must be brought 
under § 113(f), not under § 107(a). 
 
B. The Effect of Reading's Bankruptcy on 
Conrail's § 113(f) Claim 
 
How then has Reading's bankruptcy discharge affected 
Conrail's claim for contribution. The law of this circuit 
regarding the discharge of claims in bankruptcy has been 
established in a series of cases, many of which involve § 77 
railroad reorganizations. The leading case is Schweitzer v. 
Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1985). In 
Schweitzer, a group of employees sued Reading after its 
reorganization for asbestos-related injuries under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.. 
Reading invoked its bankruptcy discharge to bar the 
employees' claims, pointing out that the plaintiff-employees 
were exposed to the asbestos well before the plan 
consummation date. We rejected Reading's claim to 
absolute protection, noting that the language of § 77 
provides for the discharge of all "claims" against the debtor. 
We interpreted this language to mean that the employees' 
claims would only be discharged if their causes of action 
existed at the time of plan consummation. 758 F.2d at 941. 
We explained that "a bankruptcy claim must be based on 
state or federal law that, wholly apart from bankruptcy, 
created substantive obligations." Id. (citation omitted). We 
looked to federal tort law to determine when the claim 
arose. Noting that identifiable, compensable injury was a 
basic element of a tort claim, we held that no cause of 
action accrued until that element had been satisfied. 
Because the plaintiffs' injuries did not become manifest 
until after the reorganization, their claims did not exist 
until after plan consummation, and for that reason the 
claims were not discharged. Id. at 942; see also In re 
Central R.R. Co., 950 F.2d 887 (3d Cir. 1991) (following 
Schweitzer); Zulkowski v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 852 F.2d 
73 (3d Cir. 1988) (same); cf. In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 
332 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying Schweitzer analysis to claim 
for contribution and indemnity arising after automatic stay 
under Bankruptcy Code). 
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In Schweitzer, we also discussed the concept of a 
"contingent" claim, that is, a claim which would enable a 
person to be a creditor in the bankruptcy action even 
though that person had no present cause of action against 
the debtor. We found statutory support for such a claim in 
the language of § 77(b), which defined claims to include 
"interests of whatever character." 758 F.2d at 942. We cited 
In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 106 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 
1939), as providing an example of a contingent claim. 
There, the Second Circuit barred the contingent claim of a 
landlord against the debtor/guarantor of a lease. The court 
found that because an express contract of guarantee 
existed, the landlord could not stand idly by while the 
guarantor went into bankruptcy. The court determined that 
the claim on the guarantee had been discharged. Id. at 
942-43. Schweitzer, however, was a tort claim for personal 
injury; there was no guarantee, no legal relationship, and 
no contingent claim that could be discharged. 
 
We have followed Schweitzer in cases involving 
environmental damage. The first such case was In re Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Paoli 
Yard"). In Paoli Yard, the United States brought suit against 
Conrail, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority ("SEPTA"), and Amtrak as a result of a release of 
environmental contaminants at the Paoli Rail Yard. Conrail 
petitioned to implead the Penn Central Corporation ("PCC"), 
the reorganized entity that emerged from the § 77 
reorganization of the Penn Central Transportation Company 
("PCTC"). SEPTA and the United States also brought claims 
against PCC. As Reading has done in the present case, PCC 
argued that its § 77 reorganization barred the United 
States' claim. 
 
Applying Schweitzer, we held that the petitioners' claims 
were not barred. We first looked to see if a claim existed 
under CERCLA prior to the consummation date. We held 
that no claim existed because CERCLA had not been 
passed at the time of the reorganization: 
 
On October 24, 1978, the reorganization of PCTC was 
consummated and the injunction against the filing of 
future lawsuits . . . was entered. We note, however, 
that at the moment of the bankruptcy discharge and 
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the inception of the injunction, CERCLA had not yet 
been passed by Congress. Indeed CERCLA was not 
enacted until 1980. Consequently, at the time of the 
Consummation Order, there was no statutory basis for 
liability to be asserted against PCTC by the petitioners. 
Just as the employees in Schweitzer had no 
recognizable tort causes of action under the FELA prior 
to the employer railroad's relevant consummation 
dates, the petitioners here could not have brought 
claims under CERCLA prior to the Consummation 
Date. 
 
Id. at 167. 
 
The Paoli Yard court then turned to the possibility of 
contingent claims. As in Schweitzer we found that there 
were no contingent claims to be discharged because of the 
absence of a legal relationship. 
 
[I]t was not until the passage of CERCLA that a legal 
relationship was created between the petitioners and 
PCC relevant to the petitioners' potential causes of 
action such that an interest could flow. Because this 
legal relationship did not evolve until after the 
Consummation Date, the petitioners did not have 
contingent claims against PCTC. Accordingly, our 
decision in Schweitzer leads us to the conclusion that 
the petitioners' asserted claims under CERCLA did not 
constitute dischargeable claims within the meaning of 
section 77 and thus survive the discharge of the 
debtor. 
 
Id. at 168. 
 
Other Third Circuit cases are consistent with Paoli Yard 
and Schweitzer. In In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 771 F.2d 
762 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Pinney Dock"), the plaintiffs brought 
antitrust actions against PCC and PCTC for pre- 
reorganization conspiracies. We examined the nature of the 
plaintiffs' antitrust claims and found that they existed at 
the time of the reorganization. Consequently, the claims 
were presumed discharged by § 77, absent other  
considerations.8 We expressly distinguished Pinney Dock's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We later rejected the plaintiffs' claims of fraudulent concealment and 
inadequate notice. Id. at 768-72. 
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facts, where all elements of the claim arose before 
reorganization, from Schweitzer, where one element of the 
claim, the manifestation of the injury, did not appear until 
after consummation. Id. at 767. 
 
In our most recent decision on the subject, we applied 
the same principles. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 71 
F.3d 1113 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Bessemer"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. 
___, 116 S.Ct. 1851 (1996). Here, the Bessemer Railroad 
and USX Corporation sought contribution from PCTC for 
judgments entered against them in antitrust conspiracies. 
PCTC raised the shield of its § 77 reorganization, and we 
applied the Paoli Yard/Schweitzer analysis. We first looked 
to nonbankruptcy law to determine when the claims 
accrued. We noted that the plaintiffs sought contribution. 
Id. at 1115. The event triggering contribution occurred after 
the date of PCTC's 1978 Consummation Order. As in 
Schweitzer, the claim did not yet exist at the time of 
reorganization and thus was not barred. Moreover, as in 
Schweitzer, the plaintiffs lacked any contingent claim that 
might have been dismissed because there was no legal 
relationship between the parties. The joint rate-making 
agreement signed by the parties did not confer a right of 
indemnification, so there was no intent to look to PCTC for 
indemnity or contribution. Absent such an agreement, the 
necessary legal relationship was lacking. Id. at 1116. 
 
These cases establish the framework for our § 77 
discharge analysis. First, we must determine whether the 
CERCLA claim had accrued at the time of the 
reorganization. If so, then it was discharged. Pinney Dock, 
771 F.2d at 766. To determine whether a claim existed, we 
look to the substantive area of law governing the underlying 
claim. See Bessemer, 71 F.3d at 1114. If a claim had not 
accrued, then we must determine whether the claimant 
possessed an interest rising to the level of a contingent 
claim that would be discharged. Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at 
942. 
 
Applying these principles to Conrail's contribution claim 
yields a relatively straightforward answer. Under Paoli Yard, 
Conrail's § 113 claim was not discharged because SARA 
had not yet been enacted. In Paoli Yard, we rejected a 
CERCLA claim against PCTC because "at the moment of the 
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bankruptcy discharge and the inception of the injunction, 
CERCLA had not yet been passed by Congress. . . . 
Consequently, at the time of the Consummation Order, 
there was no statutory basis for liability to be asserted 
against PCTC by the petitioners." 944 F.2d at 167. This 
rule applies to the current case. SARA was not passed 
until 1986. Consequently, at the time of Reading's 
consummation order, there was no statutory basis for 
contribution liability. 
 
Reading attempts to avoid this conclusion by arguing 
that § 113(f) permits a contribution action based on 
prospective liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 9163(f) ("any person 
may seek contribution from any other person who is liable 
or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title . . .. 
Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any 
person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of 
a civil action . . ..") (emphasis added). Reading also notes 
that courts, finding an implied right of action under 
§ 107(a)(4)(B), interpreted that section as extending to cases 
of potential liability. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Stepan 
Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (early case 
finding private right of action). 
 
Adopting either of Reading's arguments would lead to a 
harsh result. Both would sanction Conrail for failing to 
allege claims that in December 1980 had no recognized 
legal form. Section 113's language on potential liability had 
not been enacted in 1980. Moreover, although we could 
interpret § 107(a)(4)(B)'s private right of action as emerging 
fully formed with the passage of CERCLA, the courts did 
not for several years interpret § 107(a) as containing such 
a cause of action. If we accepted Reading's position, we 
would penalize Conrail for failing to register a claim which 
would not be judicially recognized for two years. See Stepan 
Chemical, 544 F. Supp. at 1141-43. For these reasons, we 
will apply Paoli Yard and hold that Conrail's § 113(f) 
contribution claim did not yet exist at the time of Reading's 
§ 77 reorganization. Thus, it was not discharged. 
 
This ruling on discharge does not, however, end matters. 
Although Conrail's contribution claim was not discharged 
by Reading's bankruptcy, the claim nevertheless fails as a 
matter of law. Conrail's contribution claim depends on 
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Conrail and Reading both being liable to a third party, in 
this case to the United States. Because, for the reasons we 
state below, we find that the United States's claim was 
discharged by Reading's bankruptcy, Conrail's contribution 
action, based on Reading's common liability with Conrail to 
the United States, cannot proceed. 
 
As a threshold matter, the United States argues that we 
need not reach the issue of Reading's liability to the United 
States. The United States claims that the sole issue raised 
by this appeal is whether the contribution claim was 
discharged in bankruptcy. The United States asks that we 
remand this case so that the derivative nature of the 
contribution claim and its potential failure can be resolved 
by the district court. We reject this contention for two 
reasons. First, as a matter of judicial efficiency, remand 
would be wasteful. The district court reached both issues, 
holding that Conrail's § 113(f) contribution is a derivative 
claim and that the United States' claim was discharged by 
bankruptcy. Both are matters of statutory interpretation, 
presenting questions of law subject to plenary review by 
this court. See Manor Care, 950 F.2d at 124. Rather than 
remanding to the district court so that it can reexamine the 
conclusions it has already reached, we will address the 
issues. Second, although an absence of joint liability may 
be a defense, when there is no question that joint liability 
is lacking, a necessary element to establish contribution 
cannot be proven. The claim for contribution must then, as 
a matter of law, fail. Consequently, the question of 
Reading's liability to the United States under § 107 is 
entirely germane to our current discussion. 
 
We held in Part III.A, supra, that § 113(f) uses the term 
contribution in its traditional, common law sense. This 
means that CERCLA contribution, like common law 
contribution, requires some form of joint liability. See David 
B. Lilly Co. v. Fisher, 18 F.3d 1112, 1123 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Green v. United States, 775 F.2d 964, 971 (8th Cir. 1985); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A(1) (1977) ("when two 
or more persons become liable in tort to the same person 
for the same harm, there is a right of contribution among 
them, even though judgment has not been recovered 
against all or any of them"). 
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CERCLA § 113(f) captures the requirements of joint 
liability in its statutory language: "Any person may seek 
contribution from any other person who is liable or 
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during 
or following any civil action under section 9606 of this title 
or under section 9607(a) of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). 
Conrail suggests, however, that this provision establishes a 
new form of statutory contribution that spreads liability 
beyond traditional common law principles. Quoting 
Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N.R. Co., 133 B.R. 
648, 653 (D.Minn. 1991),9 Conrail argues that common 
liability by two or more defendants to one common 
government agency is not necessary under § 113(f). We 
disagree. Contribution, by its own definition, requires a 
common liability for the same injury. For example, the 
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act provides 
"where two or more persons become jointly or severally 
liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or for 
the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution 
among them even though judgment has not been recovered 
against all or any of them." Uniform Contribution Among 
Tortfeasors Act (1955 Revised Act) § 1, 12 U.L.A. 194. We 
read the language of § 113(f) as adopting the same 
traditional sense of contribution. In permitting a party to 
seek contribution from "any other person who is liable or 
potentially liable" under § 107(a), it is inherent in the 
concept of contribution that the persons commonly liable 
be liable to the same entity. Otherwise, contribution could 
become an endless circle of attempts to seek 
reimbursement from unrelated parties. 
 
Because § 113(f)(1) reflects the traditional concept of 
contribution, its language does not permit contribution 
among liable parties who do not have a common derivation 




9. Conrail's quoted language from Sylvester ("This provision [CERCLA 
§ 113(f)(1)] does not expressly require common liability to a governmental 
agency, as would be the case under common law contribution." 133 B.R. 
at 653) is arguably dictum because the court reached this conclusion 
only after it had already determined that the State of Minnesota's claim 
against the debtor had not been discharged in bankruptcy and that a 
common law right to contribution existed. 
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applies to all "joint tortfeasors," in the sense of two or 
more persons who are liable to the same person for the 
same harm. It is not necessary that they act in concert 
or in pursuance of a common design, nor is it 
necessary that they be joined as defendants. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A, cmt. b. (1977). 
Applying this traditional meaning of contribution to the 
current case, we conclude that Reading's liability to Conrail 
depends on Reading's liability to the United States. To be 
liable for contribution, Reading must be liable to the United 
States under § 107(a). 
 
Conrail points out that there are two relevant bases of 
liability under § 107(a). As provided in § 107(a)(4)(A), a PRP 
is liable in contribution for "all costs of removal or remedial 
action incurred by the United States Government or a State 
or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national 
contingency plan . . .." Or, under § 107(a)(4)(B), a party is 
liable for "any other necessary costs of response incurred 
by any other person consistent with the national 
contingency plan." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). 
 
Conrail contends that, because Reading can be liable to 
Conrail under § 107(a)(4)(B) for costs incurred by Conrail, 
contribution is not dependent on Reading's liability to the 
United States under § 107(a)(4)(A). But Conrail is mixing 
apples and oranges. It is describing a direct action for 
cleanup costs and arguing that the possibility of such an 
action demonstrates that common liability is not necessary 
for contribution. We do not accept this circular argument 
as valid. 
 
As we have demonstrated in Part III.A., to the extent that 
Conrail seeks apportionment of the expenses of cleanup, it 
must do so under § 113(f). Reading's § 113(f) liability for 
contribution depends on its liability to the United States. 
Having come to this conclusion, we must then examine the 
effect of Reading's § 77 reorganization on the United 
States's claim against Reading. Applying the Schweitzer/ 
Paoli Yard analysis, we find that all four CERCLA elements 
making up the United States' claim existed at the time of 
Reading's § 77 reorganization. The United States' claim 
against Reading had therefore accrued, and it was 
discharged by the consummation order. 
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We set out the elements of a § 107(a) CERCLA claim in 
Part III.A., supra. As to the four elements, there is no 
dispute that Reading was a "responsible party," that 
hazardous substances were disposed of at the Douglassville 
"facility," or that a "release" occurred. The only issue is 
whether the United States incurred response costs prior to 
December 31, 1980. It did. 
 
Under the law of this circuit, "if a particular government 
action qualifies as a `removal action' under the definition 
contained in CERCLA, the government's costs are 
recoverable under the unambiguous language of § 107, 
regardless of what statutory authority was invoked by EPA 
in connection with its action." United States v. Rohm & 
Haas, 2 F.3d 1265, 1274-75 and n.15 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(emphasis added). A removal action involves 
 
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous 
substances from the environment, such actions as may 
be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release 
of hazardous substances into the environment, such 
actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and 
evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous 
substances, the disposal of removed material, or the 
taking of such other actions as may be necessary to 
prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public 
heal or welfare or to the environment. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). 
 
In both 1970 and 1972, federal environmental agencies, 
acting pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, 
undertook cleanups of massive releases from the 
Douglassville site. These cleanups meet the definition of a 
"removal action." The United States never recovered its 
"response costs" for these efforts. Consequently, on the date 
of Reading's § 77 reorganization, all four CERCLA elements 
were met. The United States possessed an actual claim 
against Reading. 
 
The United States has not challenged any of these 
elements on appeal, choosing instead to advance a novel 
interpretation of Schweitzer. The United States suggests 
that Schweitzer always requires a legal relationship between 
the claimant and the debtor before a claim can be barred. 
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The United States then metamorphoses the legal 
relationship requirement into a test turning on whether the 
government had knowledge of the potential claim. This is 
simply wrong. Schweitzer requires a legal relationship only 
for the discharge of a contingent claim in bankruptcy. No 
such relationship is needed for an accrued claim. The 
United States' CERCLA claim had accrued at the time of 
the reorganization. The question of a legal relationship is 
therefore irrelevant. See Paoli Yard, 944 F.2d at 167-68 
(discussing legal relationship only for contingent claim); 
Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at 943 (same); see also In re 
Remington Rand Corp., 836 F.2d 825, 833 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(applying Schweitzer; holding government contract claim 
discharged where claim was contingent and relationship 
arose from government audit revealing claim). 
 
Moreover, even if we were to accept the United States's 
argument and assume that some degree of knowledge is a 
prerequisite for discharge of an accrued claim (and under 
Schweitzer it is not), we would still hold that the claim was 
discharged. The question of knowledge is a question of fact, 
subject to review only for clear error. See Riehl v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 19, 24 (3d Cir. 1985) (describing 
knowledge of toxic dumping as an issue of fact); see also 
Consumers Produce Co., Inc. v. Volante Wholesale Produce, 
Inc., 16 F.3d 1374, 1383 (3d Cir. 1993) (reviewing finding of 
constructive knowledge of breach of trust for clear error); 
Brock v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, 846 F.2d 180, 188 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (reviewing finding of knowledge of legal violation 
for clear error). The district court made factualfindings that 
the United States had knowledge of its claim prior to the 
bankruptcy discharge: the United States knew the 
Douglassville site was an environmental trouble spot and 
Reading Railroad was connected to it; by October 31, 1980, 
the EPA had identified the site as potential hazardous 
waste site; federal officials had twice responded to cleanup 
needs at the site; EPA knew Reading Railroad had operated 
a rail line to the site; in 1972 EPA had ordered Reading 
Railroad to haul waste from the site; and ICC tariffs, 
available as part of the bankruptcy proceedings, showed 
that Reading transported hazardous materials to the site. In 
re Reading Co., 900 F.Supp. at 745-46. In making these 
findings, the district court also relied on the length of the 
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Reading Railroad's bankruptcy, the government's 
substantial participation in it, and the large amount of 
publicity that surrounded CERCLA's passage, along with 
EPA's advocacy of the statute. Id. The court's finding of 
knowledge merits deference. With ample support in the 
record, we cannot say its holding was clearly erroneous. 
Because of this finding, the United States would lose on the 
knowledge issue even if we were to conclude that knowledge 
was necessary. 
 
We hold therefore that under our decisions in Schweitzer 
and Paoli Yard, the United States' CERCLA claim against 
Reading for environmental clean-up at the Douglassville 
site was discharged in the § 77 reorganization. Reading is 
not liable to the United States under § 107(a)(4)(A), and 
Reading is therefore not a "person who is liable or 
potentially liable under [§ 107(a)] of this title," 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(f)(1). Conrail's claim for contribution under § 113(f) 
fails as a matter of law. 
 
At oral argument, Conrail mentioned for the first time 
that it had spent over $1 million on remedial measures at 
the Douglassville site. Because of the lateness of Conrail's 
assertion of any such direct expense, we will not analyze 
the nature of Conrail's claims to ascertain if Conrail is in 
fact asserting a claim that is more than one for 
contribution. See, e.g., United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 
1064 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that failure to raise an 
issue until it is brought up at oral argument constitutes a 
waiver). For that reason, we do not need to consider 
whether, under the guidelines we have set out in New 
Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., Conrail can 
maintain a direct claim under § 107(a)(4)(B) in addition to a 




We hold therefore that Reading's § 77 reorganization bars 
any claim by Conrail for § 113(f) contribution from Reading 
for the Douglassville site. In reaching this conclusion, we 
have not elevated bankruptcy law over CERCLA, nor do we 
perceive a clash between the two systems. Each performs 
its respective function. Our opinion merely demonstrates 
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that CERCLA claims are treated like any other claim in 
bankruptcy. Because Reading's liability to the United States 
for the Douglassville site was discharged in its § 77 
reorganization, we will affirm the order of the district court. 
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